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ABSTRACT 
Why do the poor make shortsighted choices in decisions that involve delayed payoffs? Foregoing 
immediate rewards for larger, later rewards requires that decision-makers (a) believe future 
payoffs will occur and (b) are not forced to take the immediate reward out of financial need. 
Low-income individuals may be both less likely to believe future payoffs will occur, and less 
able to forego immediate rewards due to higher financial need; they may thus appear to discount 
the future more heavily. We propose that trust in one’s community—which, unlike generalized 
trust, we find does not covary with levels of income—can partially offset the effects of low 
income on myopic decisions. Specifically, we hypothesize that low-income individuals with 
higher community trust make less myopic intertemporal decisions because they believe their 
community will buffer, or cushion, against their financial need. In archival data and lab studies, 
we find that higher levels of community trust among low-income individuals lead to less myopic 
decisions. We also test our predictions with a two-year community trust intervention in rural 
Bangladesh involving 121 union councils (the smallest rural administrative and local government 
unit) and find that residents in treated union councils show higher levels of community trust and 
make less myopic intertemporal choices than residents in control union councils. We discuss the 
implications of these results for the design of domestic and global policy interventions to help 
the poor make decisions that could alleviate poverty. 





RUNNING HEAD: COMMUNITY TRUST AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING 
 3 
SIGNIFICANCE 
More than 1.5 billion people worldwide live in poverty. Even in the U.S., 14% live below the 
poverty line. Despite many policies and programs, poverty remains a domestic and global 
challenge; the number of U.S. households earning less than $2 a day nearly doubled in the last 15 
years. One reason why the poor remain poor is their tendency to make myopic decisions. With 
reduced temporal discounting, low-income individuals could invest more in forward-looking 
educational, financial, and social activities that could alleviate their impoverished situation. We 
show that increased community trust can decrease temporal discounting in low-income 
populations and test this mechanism in a two-year field intervention in rural Bangladesh through 
a low-cost and scalable method that builds community trust. 
/body  
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Low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions that favor the short-term but 
neglect long-term outcomes (1, 2). People living in poverty are more likely to discount future 
payoffs compared to wealthier individuals, which can in part be attributed to the specific 
environment in which these decisions are made. From US households (3) to rural Ethiopian 
farmers (4), lower wealth predicts higher temporal discount rates. A myopic orientation, in turn, 
makes it less likely individuals escape poverty as they fail to engage in behaviors that benefit 
them in the long-term, such as investing in education, health and finances (1, 5, 6). This creates a 
vicious cycle: poverty leads to short-sighted choices which in turn lead to poverty (7). But why 
are the poor more likely to make myopic decisions, and what interventions can be designed to 
shift their decisions toward the long-term? 
 Three broad theoretical perspectives address why poor people appear myopic. An 
economic perspective views the poor as people who, like the rest of society, engage in actions 
that align with their goals in a rational manner (8, 9). Poor people make myopic decisions, then, 
because they lack the opportunities to alleviate their impoverished situation. They do the best 
they can, given their circumstances. A sociological perspective describes the decisions of the 
poor as emanating from a ‘culture of poverty’ which often entails misguided goals and motives 
(10, 11). Low-income individuals make decisions contrary to their long-term interests because 
they value different ends. Finally, a recently proposed psychological perspective suggests that 
poverty affects how the poor process information (7). Because poverty-related concerns consume 
mental resources, they leave less capacity for other tasks. This in turn promotes higher 
discounting because poor people are not able to adequately plan for the future (1, 2). Common to 
all three perspectives is the assumption that low- and high-income individuals share a similar 
calculating logic when trading off intertemporal choices. They differ in the reasons provided for 
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why this logic gets skewed, proposing either a lack of opportunities, a lack of education, or 
limited mental bandwidth (1, 2, 8, 10–12). 
We suggest a related but different possibility, namely that the poor are engaged in a 
different kind of mental calculus. To even consider accepting a delayed payoff requires both, a 
belief that the delayed payoff will occur (13, 14), and the ability to forego the immediate payoff 
(15). Hence, whereas high-income individuals may ask, “Is a delayed payoff of $100 worth $85 
today?”, low-income individuals may instead ask, “Do I think I will really get the delayed 
payoff?” and “Can I afford to forego the immediate payoff?”. Such pessimism or skepticism may 
have multiple origins: adverse past experience with delayed payoffs failing to materialize or the 
absence of good experiences to draw from (16); and the tendency for low-income individuals to 
worry more about their immediate needs because these needs loom larger (17). Intertemporal 
choice is thus not only a question of discounting delayed payoffs for their distance in time, but 
also depends on (a) trusting that delayed payoffs will occur, and (b) trusting that needs are 
sufficiently met to enable foregoing the immediate payoff. 
 Hence, we focus on a different, currently understudied, element of intertemporal 
decisions—trust—and use it to offer an alternative explanation that helps integrate and reconcile 
the three approaches above. Specifically, we argue that choosing delayed outcomes in 
intertemporal decisions requires trusting that future payoffs will occur, as well as trusting that 
immediate financial needs will be sufficiently met to make considering the long-term possible. In 
the absence of trust, it might be rational to favor the short- over the long-term (as the economic 
perspective suggests; 8, 12). Increasing trust can help change values, goals and motives to favor 
the long- over the short-term (as the sociological perspective suggests; 10, 11). Finally, the 
presence of trust may help reduce negative affect and stress, so improving the quality of long-
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term decision-making (as the psychological perspective suggests; 1, 2). In all three cases, 
however, trust is the underlying driver of myopic decisions. 
 We present evidence from four studies using archival, correlational, experimental and 
field data to provide support for the hypothesis that trust drives intertemporal choices. Further, as 
we detail below, we suggest that two types of trust matter: (a) generalized trust, which extends to 
the social environment more generally, increases with income, and influences the belief that  
long-term payoffs will occur; and (b) community trust, which extends to an individual’s 
community, does not vary with income, and influences the belief that financial needs will be 
sufficiently met. We specifically highlight the role of community trust, and suggest that 
interventions designed to increase community trust among low-income individuals can reduce 
their myopic behavior, in turn helping them alleviate their impoverished situation. 
Finding 1: Generalized Trust Varies with Level of Income 
 Investing in a long-term payoff implicitly involves trusting that promised long-term 
benefits will materialize (13, 14). Studies conducted with young children show that when they do 
not trust their environment, they are less likely to forego immediate payoffs (e.g., a small 
quantity of a desired snack) for a delayed, larger payoff (e.g., a larger quantity of a desired 
snack; 18). Indeed, in a situation where the receipt of a delayed option is not guaranteed, 
investing in the short-term is likely the rational thing to do (14). Trust can be seen as a 
mechanism to deal with the impacts of unpredictability that helps individuals cope with social 
uncertainty and complexity (19). This notion is reflected in the political science literature which 
recognizes ‘generalized trust’—“a set of moral values [that] create regular expectations of 
regular and honest behavior” (20)—as an important source of individually and socially valuable 
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outcomes, such as health and happiness (21). Partly for these reasons, generalized trust plays an 
important role in economic growth (22, 23). 
Evidence suggests that trust is unequally distributed throughout society. Trust can be thought of 
as a belief (24) that emerges from a number of observations or experiences over time (25). 
Individuals with higher incomes are more likely to have favorable experiences in their lives, 
whereas those with lower incomes are more likely to experience violations of trust (13, 26). 
Much of what poor people experience (e.g., negative income shocks) reinforces a lack of trust in 
their environment (27). The intertemporal decisions of low-income individuals may therefore in 
part merely be factoring in the perceived uncertainty of long-term investments paying off (14).  
To confirm these predictions, we analyzed data from the World Values Survey 
(N=220,145), a nationally representative survey conducted in almost 100 countries (28). 
Generalized trust in this survey is assessed through the question “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Respondents can choose between two possible options: “Most people can be trusted,” (coded as 
0) and “Need to be very careful” (coded as 1). Although this single-item, dichotomous measure 
of generalized trust is problematic (29), studies have found it to be a related to other valid and 
relevant variables (30, 31). Income in the survey is self-reported on a scale from 1 (lowest group) 
to 10 (highest group), with respondents asked to consider “all wages, salaries, pensions and other 
incomes” when responding. We estimate a logistic regression of income as a predictor of 
generalized trust and find that the coefficient of income is significant (β=-.07, SE=.002, p<.001), 
indicating that high-income individuals have higher levels of generalized trust. Thus, low-
income individuals may be more doubtful that a long-term payoff will materialize, which can 
reduce the appeal of a larger, later option. 
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Finding 2: Financial Needs Vary with Levels of Income 
 In intertemporal choices, low-income individuals also have to determine whether their 
current financial situation allows them to forego the immediate reward. A staggering proportion 
of U.S. households—nearly 50%—are unable to come up with $2,000 over the course of a month 
if they needed to (15). When levels of savings are low, as is likely the case for low-income 
individuals, they may be unable to forego the smaller, sooner payoff because they require the 
money to alleviate their immediate needs (32).  
To investigate this, we recruited 285 participants from the United States who were asked 
to imagine a situation where they had to choose between receiving $100 today or $150 in a year, 
and probed to list some of the issues they would consider when making this decision (see SI for 
additional details; all experiments we report here were approved by the Columbia University 
Institutional Review Board and all participants provided informed consent). Participants 
additionally responded to a three-item scale that assessed financial need (e.g., “Given my current 
financial constraints, I need to take $100 today rather than wait for the delayed payoff ($150 in 
one year)”). Next, we measured participants’ levels of income and their levels of generalized 
trust through a six-item scale (33). Finally, we asked participants which of the two options they 
would choose: $100 today or $150 in a year. 
116 individuals (40.7%) stated that their current financial situation constrained their 
choice. Unsurprisingly, we find that levels of income are related to financial need (β=-0.035, 
SE=.006, p<.001), such that lower income is related to higher financial need. When we introduce 
both financial need and income into a linear regression predicting the choice of delayed ($150 in 
a year) over the immediate option ($100 today), only financial need is a significant predictor (β=-
.12, SE=.0013, p<.001), while income is not (β=.0011, SE=.0014, p=.41). Crucially, generalized 
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trust is not related to financial need (β=.03, SE=.102, p=.76): beliefs regarding whether the long-
term payoff will materialize do not influence participants’ evaluation of their financial situation. 
Similar to data from the World Values Survey described above, generalized trust is positively 
related to income (β=.008, SE=.004, p=.027). 
Taken together, Findings 1 and 2 suggest that low-income individuals are both less likely 
to believe long-term payoffs will occur, and less able to forego the immediate reward due to 
higher financial need. Does this, however, mean that low-income individuals are doomed to 
being myopic? We turn to this question next. 
Finding 3: Community Trust Can Act as a Buffer for Low-Income Individuals 
Prior research emphasizes the important role of the local community in influencing the 
experience of everyday life (21). Communities even shape an individual’s willingness to take 
financial risks. For instance, one study found that Chinese participants were less risk-averse than 
Americans, attributing this difference to cultural differences between the two groups. “In 
socially-collectivist cultures like China, family or other in-group members will step in to help out 
any group member who encounters a large and possibly catastrophic loss” (34). In contrast, in 
individualistic cultures such as the United States, individuals who make risky decisions are 
usually expected to face the consequences of their decisions. The social structure that reflects 
collectivistic societies therefore acts as a “cushion” against possible losses from risky decisions, 
allowing individuals in collectivistic societies to be less risk-averse (34, 35). Such differences do 
not exist only between, but also within nations (36); one study suggests that nearly 80% of total 
cultural variation exists within, rather than between nations (13). 
Supporting evidence for the important role of the community also originates from 
research conducted on the “buffering hypothesis,” that suggests that strong ties to close others 
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have beneficial effects on individuals’ well-being (37, 38). The perceived availability of support 
allows individuals to appraise stressful situations as less aversive, which makes it less likely such 
events will negatively influence them (39). Because higher financial need is often experienced as 
stressful (32), stronger support from the local community may also reduce the aversive impact of 
financial need. Importantly, the experiences that give rise to community trust are based on an 
individual’s interactions with their immediate surroundings, and not with their general 
environment as a whole, as is the case for generalized trust. Thus, trust in one’s local community 
to “cushion” against potential losses, or “buffer” against the stress of lower income, may be 
distributed more evenly across the income spectrum than generalized trust.  To further 
investigate this, we again turn to the World Values Survey where individuals also respond to the 
question: “I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from your neighborhood. Could you 
tell me whether you trust people from this group?” Respondents have four possible options: (a) 
“Trust completely,” (b) “Trust somewhat,” (c) “Do not trust very much,” or (d) “Do not trust at 
all.” We conducted an ordinal logistic regression of community trust against levels of income 
and find that levels of income do not predict levels of community trust (p=.15; see SI). 
In addition, in the pilot study for Finding 2 above (with 285 U.S. participants), we also 
measured levels of community trust using a 13-item measure (adapted from (40)). Example items 
included “I do a lot of good things in my neighborhood” and “There are advantages to living in 
my neighborhood.” We regress community trust onto our measure of financial need, and find a 
significant negative relationship (β=-.58, SE=.136, p<0.01), such that individuals with higher 
community trust reported lower financial need. This relationship also holds when adding income 
as an additional predictor (β=-.40, SE=.126, p<0.01).  
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Hence, higher community trust influences the choice of delayed payoffs by reducing low-
income individuals’ perceived constraints. The same level of actual financial need, based on an 
individual’s current financial situation, may be experienced differently with varying levels of 
community trust. When individuals experience lower levels of community trust, actual financial 
needs are unlikely to be mitigated by the local community. However, when individuals 
experience higher levels of community trust, actual financial needs are alleviated by the 
buffering and cushioning the local community provides. In turn, when their needs are not felt as 
acutely, low-income individuals with higher community trust are better able to consider the long-
term option. 
 Accordingly, we argue that it is important to consider the effects of generalized trust as 
distinct from community trust on the long-term decisions of the poor. Although both higher 
generalized or community trust can theoretically support the choice of a delayed payoff, we 
propose there are at least three reasons why a focus on community trust is a more viable basis for 
an intervention to reduce myopic intertemporal choices among low-income individuals. First, 
because community trust does not covary with income while generalized trust does, low-income 
individuals may already have higher base rates of community trust, and this may make an 
intervention simpler and more effective. 
Second, personal beliefs are often resistant to change (41). While interventions to 
influence personal beliefs exist (42), they require repeated, in-depth exposure and experiences 
that serve to reinforce the intended belief change. Generalized trust is a more entrenched belief 
and less amenable to change than community trust; the latter, based on interactions with one’s 
immediate surroundings, has more touchpoints for possible interventions. Moreover, 
interventions that focus on community trust require fewer major changes to governmental 
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institutions compared to treatments that aim to change generalized trust. Creating an intervention 
to change generalized trust requires more time, intense exposure, and systemic change than an 
intervention to change community trust. 
Third, while generalized trust influences intertemporal choices by signaling to individuals 
how likely it is the long-term payoff will occur, community trust influences the level of financial 
need individuals experience and thus their ability to consider foregoing the immediate payoff. 
There may be instances when a lack of generalized trust is warranted, i.e., where the delayed 
payoff—should individuals choose it—does not occur. Thus, an intervention that increases 
generalized trust may backfire when low-income individuals choose the larger, later option and it 
does not materialize. Instead, a focus on community trust is less likely to backfire because its 
higher levels ameliorate the financial constraints low-income individuals face. We now turn to 
Study 1 which seeks to establish the role of community trust in influencing temporal discounting 
by low-income individuals.  
Study 1: Community Trust and Temporal Discounting by Low-income Individuals 
This study was an online experiment with 647 participants from the United States (see SI for 
additional details). We first presented respondents with the same 13-item scale of community 
trust as above (40). We then assessed their temporal discount factor (the multiplier that equates 
$100 in a year’s time with the amount that an individual is willing to take instead, if received 
today) using DEEP (43), an adaptive testing platform where participants repeatedly choose 
between a smaller payoff that is received closer to the present (Smaller/Sooner) and a larger one 
that is received further into the future (Larger/Later). Although decisions are hypothetical, 
temporal discount factors predict real-world intertemporal decisions, such as mortgage choices 
(44), and their consequences, such as credit scores (45). Indeed, decisions in other delay-
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discounting tasks are predictive of a wide range of long-term outcomes, such as health, 
education, and retirement savings (46, 47). Finally, respondents reported their current levels of 
income, as well as their gender, age and education. 
 Replicating previous studies (1, 2, 7), we find that discount factors vary with levels of 
income (β=.0034, SE=.0015, p=.021), such that individuals with higher levels of income 
discounted the future less than those with lower levels of income. To illustrate this, we 
categorized participants with household incomes below $40,000 as low-income and those with 
incomes above $40,000 as high-income, and found that low-income participants discounted the 
future more (M=.131, SE=.006) than high-income participants (M=.159, SE=.006), with lower 
discount factors indicating greater discounting. This cut-off point represents the median in our 
sample. Similar cut-off points are often used in prior research (48, 49). Cut-off points higher or 
lower than $40,000 do not significantly change our results.  
 Next, we regressed the discount factor on continuous income and community trust as well 
as the interaction between the two predictor variables. In addition to the main effect of income 
already mentioned, we find a main effect of community trust (β=.0015, SE=.0007, p=.025), such 
that individuals with higher levels of community trust discount the future less. Both main effects 
are qualified by a significant interaction between community trust and levels of income on 
temporal discounting (β=-.0052, SE=.0023, p=.026). These effects also hold when we control for 
demographic variables such as age, gender, and education (see Table S1). 
 To better understand the interaction between community trust and income, we 
next conducted simple slopes analyses (50) and found that higher levels of income were only 
related to lower discounting of the future when levels of community trust were low (t(643)=2.86, 
p=.0044) but not when levels of community trust were high (t(643)=-.032, p=.748). Hence, only 
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individuals with low incomes and low levels of community trust differ significantly from all 
other groups (see Figure S1). We now turn to Study 2 which seeks to examine the impact of 
community trust on the temporal discounting of low-income individuals in a richer real-world 
context.  
Study 2: Community Trust and Payday Loans 
In Study 2 we investigate whether taking out a payday loan—a typical form of myopic behavior 
displayed by low-income individuals—varies with levels of community trust (see SI for 
additional details). To do so, we combine state level data from the Survey of Household 
Economics and Decision-making (SHED) with an additional survey that measured community 
trust, which we conducted among 5,721 US participants in 50 states.  
 We recruited US participants through a stratified sampling method, such that ~100 
participants responded per state. Participants responded to questions assessing their levels of 
community trust using the same scale as in Study 1. Based on these responses, we created state 
averages. We also obtained state-level data of additional control variables, such as income, 
unemployment, and age. Through SHED, we accessed state-level data on payday loan usage, and 
matched both datasets at the state level. 
 An OLS regression with state level payday loan usage as the dependent variable and state 
level community trust as the independent variable finds that community trust predicts payday 
loan usage (β=-.15, SE=.041, p<.001). This effect also holds when we control for other variables 
such as age, income, and unemployment. Crucially, this effect also holds when controlling for 
levels of savings (β=-.11, SE=.033, p=.001), a proxy for levels of actual financial need. This 
provides further support that higher levels of community trust reduce perceived financial need, 
even when levels of actual financial need vary. Although Studies 1 and 2 suggest that community 
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trust plays a role in buffering or cushioning low-income individuals against myopic discounting, 
this evidence is correlational. We now turn to a study which attempts to establish causal evidence 
for the proposed relationship.  
Study 3: Exploring the Causal Link between Community Trust and Temporal Discounting 
by Low-income Individuals in the Lab 
We recruited 120 participants online and assigned them to one of four possible conditions in a 2-
by-2 design. Specifically, the design involved manipulating levels of felt income (low/high) and 
levels of felt community trust (low/high). Imagining more severe financial implications has been 
shown to evoke feelings of having lower income (2). To induce low versus high levels of felt 
income, we used previously developed and validated scenarios (2). Participants in the high felt-
income condition were asked to imagine scenarios with relatively minor financial implications, 
while those in the low felt-income condition were asked to imagine scenarios with more severe 
financial implications.  
 We manipulated levels of community trust by increasing the salience of this construct in 
the minds of respondents (51). We gave participants a definition of community trust (“the extent 
to which you trust your community”). We then asked them to list either two (low) or ten (high) 
examples from their own experience where community trust was justified. In contrast to studies 
that use a similar design to manipulate difficulty-of-retrieval (52), participants in this study had 
to produce the full number of examples requested. Subjects did not experience difficulties in 
providing examples. Next we assessed temporal discounting using DEEP (43). We also collected 
data on several demographic variables. 
 Consistent with what we would expect if our manipulation of felt-income was successful, 
we found that participants in the low felt-income condition were more myopic (M=.14, SE=.015) 
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than participants in the high felt-income condition (M=.178, SE=.017, p=.044). We examined 
whether community trust serves as a buffer or cushion for individuals with lower levels of felt 
income by testing for an interaction effect between levels of community trust and felt income on 
the temporal discount factor. An ANOVA with felt income and manipulated community trust as 
the independent variables and the discount factor as the dependent variable shows a marginally 
significant interaction (F(3,116)=3.109, p<0.10). To further investigate which condition is driving 
this effect, we conducted pairwise comparisons. These revealed that three conditions differ 
significantly from a fourth. Participants in the low felt income, low community trust condition 
were more myopic (M=.113, SE=.019) than individuals in the low felt income, high community 
trust (M=.178, SE=.024; p=.04), high felt income, low community trust (M=.176, SE=.018; 
p=.032) and high felt income, high community trust (M=.179, SE=.03; p=.045) conditions. These 
results hold when controlling for additional control variables (e.g., age, gender, education and 
actual income). 
 Study 3 provides lab-based causal evidence in support of our hypothesis that low-income 
individuals with higher levels of community trust discount the future less heavily than low-
income individuals with lower levels of community trust. While our previous studies show that 
community trust does not vary by income and that perceptions of such trust can be manipulated 
in a lab setting, we now turn to showing that community trust can be built in a real-world context 
and test if doing so reduces myopic intertemporal decisions.  
Study 4: Exploring the Causal Link between Community Trust and Temporal Discounting 
by Low-income Individuals in the Field  
In this study, we sought to replicate our findings in a field setting featuring a different cultural 
context and involving ultra-poor individuals (see SI for additional details). To do so, we 
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collaborated with BRAC, an international development organization based in Bangladesh, and 
The Hunger Project (THP), a global non-profit organization with headquarters in New York. In 
February 2014, BRAC and THP launched a two-year intervention designed to increase 
community trust in 121 union councils (the smallest rural administrative and local government 
units) in four districts of Bangladesh (Kishoreganj, Habiganj, Sunamgonj, and Bagerhat). Sixty-
one union councils received the intervention while 60 union councils were in the control 
condition (see Table S2 for demographic information, and SI for additional details).  
 The intervention had two components. First, volunteers from the community were trained 
to act as intermediaries between the community and the local government. This required the 
volunteers to interact with other members of their community, provide input into local 
governance, and help residents access public services from the local government. Second, a 
platform was created for inclusive community-driven governance to change the way community-
level decisions were made. This involved representatives from the community working with the 
local government to make community-level decisions, for example in the distribution of social 
benefits, the allocation of funds and resources for development projects, and the selection of 
people to employ in publicly funded projects. At the end of the two-year intervention, we 
surveyed individuals (N=1,447) in all 121 union councils on their levels of community trust as 
well as assessing their temporal discounting. We measured temporal discounting using a pen-
and-paper titration measure (53).  
We first tested whether our intervention increased levels of community trust in treatment 
union councils. Our intervention was successful: we find a significant difference in levels of 
community trust between treatment and control union councils (estimate=-.14, SE=.026, 
p<.001), such that levels of community trust (ranging from 1 to 5) are higher in treatment 
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(M=3.45, SE=.0015) than control union councils (M=3.31, SE=.0013). There were no significant 
differences between treatment and control union councils for generalized trust. We next specified 
a hierarchical linear model, which nests union councils within condition, and clusters standard 
errors at the union council level. This allows us to account for differences between union 
councils and provides a more accurate analysis of the treatment effect. Our dependent variable is 
individuals’ temporal discount factor. As Table S3 shows, participants in treatment union 
councils were significantly more likely to discount the future less heavily (β=.081, SE=.034, 
p=.018). In concordance with our prior studies, measured generalized trust, as shown in Model 2, 
is an additional significant predictor (β=.54, SE=.13, p<.01), such that those individuals with 
higher levels of generalized trust are more likely to discount the future less. The addition of 
further control variables does not significantly influence individuals’ tendency to discount the 
future (see Model 3). This effect also holds when controlling for levels of income, a proxy for 
levels of actual financial need, providing further evidence that higher levels of community trust 
reduce perceived financial need even when levels of actual financial need vary. To further 
establish the role of community trust in reducing perceived financial need, we also conducted 
forty-two qualitative interviews and eight focus group discussions in fourteen union councils, 
seven treatment and seven control (see SI for further information).  
 In sum, this field study shows that an intervention designed to increase levels of 
community trust successfully does so and, in the process, affects temporal discounting, such that 
individuals in treatment union councils are less myopic in their intertemporal decisions than 
individuals in control union councils. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions. This can, in turn, 
make it more difficult for them to alleviate their impoverished condition. At least three broad 
perspectives have addressed why low-income individuals are more likely to discount the future 
more heavily. An economic perspective views individuals living in poverty as people who, like 
the rest of society, engage in actions that align with their goals in a rational manner (8, 9). A 
sociological perspective describes the decisions of the poor as emanating from a ‘culture of 
poverty’ which often entails misguided goals and motives (10, 11). Finally, a psychological 
perspective suggests that poverty itself affects individuals’ information processing (7). These 
perspectives share the assumption that low- and high-income individuals use a similar logic in 
their trade-off calculation.  
 In this paper, we focus on a different, understudied, element of intertemporal decisions—
trust. We show that low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions because 
(a) they have lower levels of generalized trust, thus reducing their belief that the delayed payoff 
will occur; and (b) they have higher levels of financial need, thus constraining their ability to 
forego the immediate payoff. Because community trust reduces the felt impact of actual financial 
need, low-income individuals with higher levels of community trust make less myopic 
intertemporal decisions.  Indeed, community trust reduces myopic intertemporal choices even 
when controlling for actual financial need as in Studies 2 and 4, providing further support that 
higher levels of community increase levels of perceived financial need. By increasing levels of 
community trust, the myopic behavior of low-income individuals can be reduced, potentially 
helping them improve their financial well-being. Generalized trust, in our studies as well as in 
previous work, also affects people’s delay discounting but may be more difficult to change. It is 
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worth noting that our community trust intervention in Study 4 did not impact levels of 
generalized trust. 
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we highlight that aside from the 
differential impact of time delay, intertemporal choice may also be influenced by beliefs about 
whether long-term payoffs will occur, and the ability to forego immediate payoffs. Because low-
income individuals are less likely to generally trust their environment, myopic decisions may 
reflect not just greater impatience, but also reduced belief that long-term payoffs will occur. In 
addition, because low-income individuals are more likely to experience greater financial need, 
myopic decisions may also reflect an inability to consider long-term options. This perspective 
allows us to integrate previous approaches that have attempted to explain why low-income 
individuals are more likely to discount the future more heavily, and provides a single consistent 
explanation capable of reconciling differences between approaches. Specifically, in the absence 
of trust, it might be rational to favor the short over the long-term (as the economic perspective 
suggests). Further, the presence of trust can help reduce negative affect and stress, in turn 
improving the quality of long-term decision-making (as the psychological perspective suggests). 
Increasing trust can help change values, goals and motives to favor the long-term over the short-
term (as the sociological perspective suggests). Those low-income individuals who trust their 
community may be more willing to choose delayed payoffs because they are able to rely on their 
community to alleviate their financial needs, which in turn allows them to consider foregoing 
immediate payoffs. In all cases, trust is an underlying driver of the change in myopic behavior. 
Second, we distinguish between generalized trust, which we and others show to vary with 
income, and community trust, which we show does not. Because community trust only deals 
with an individual’s immediate social environment, and not with the general environment as a 
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whole, interventions need only focus on an individual’s direct social environment, rather than the 
general environment as a whole. Generalized trust reflects a more enduring mindset, whereas 
beliefs about one’s community are drawn from people’s transactions and interactions with their 
immediate surroundings, which are more amenable to targeted interventions. Third, our 
theoretical model generates a novel intervention strategy that we tested in the context of rural 
Bangladesh. Specifically, an intervention designed to increase levels of community trust was 
effective in shifting temporal preferences toward the long-term. Such an approach has benefits 
over interventions based on prior perspectives on the myopic behavior of low-income individuals 
that have produced mixed results, for example through microfinance (54) or financial literacy 
programs (55). In contrast, because higher community trust reduces perceived financial need, 
this paper highlights a relatively low-cost, empowering, and scalable intervention.  
 While each of our studies has its individual limitations, we deliberately adopted a 
multiple study strategy that varies methods, types of data, and contexts to ensure that the 
strengths of each study would compensate for the weaknesses of the others, and that taken 
together, they would generate broad support for our theoretical model. Thus, in our lab and field 
studies, we focus on temporal discounting but do not examine whether changes in temporal 
discounting lead to changes in downstream behavior. However Study 2 shows that our model 
holds when predicting real world payday loan usage. And while this archival study did not use 
individual-level data, we attempted to provide that level of rigor in our controlled experimental 
lab studies. Finally, while our lab studies lack external validity, we aim to provide this through 
our two-year field study that manipulates levels of community trust in rural Bangladesh. Due to 
field constraints, we were unable to collect data from the same individuals before and after the 
intervention in Bangladesh. Doing so would have allowed for a more powerful research design 
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including a difference-in-difference comparison (56). We also did not incentivize our 
intertemporal choice tasks. While it is preferable to use incentivized tasks, hypothetical choice 
tasks are widely used and predictive of real-world outcomes (45). Future research should 
incorporate a repeated-measures design that incentivizes intertemporal choices before and after 
intervention and tracks the impacts of the intervention for important real-world outcomes, such 
as levels of income over time.  
 Poverty is one of the world’s most vexing problems. Though great progress has been 
made in alleviating poverty, there is still a long way to go, both domestically, and globally. For 
example, in the US, the number of households with less than $2 per day per person has nearly 
doubled in the last 15 years (57). Progress is often impeded because low-income individuals tend 
to discount the future more than is advised. To tackle this challenge, our theory and results 
suggests policy should move beyond a sole focus on the low-income individual, and instead 
provide additional emphasis on the low-income community. Policy-makers could implement 
changes that give individuals in low-income communities more opportunities to develop 
community trust. This can be achieved, for example, by increasing the opportunities for 
interaction, or giving community members more say over decision-making at the local level. The 
poor may lack in material wealth relative to the rich, but they possess social wealth in the shape 
of their communities upon which they can draw. Building and boosting community trust can help 
decrease myopic decision-making and, in turn, contribute to reducing the incidence of poverty 
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Supplementary Information is submitted alongside this paper (Materials and Methods, Tables 
S1-S3, Figure S1). 
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